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The Shadow Magnate: How Bachar Kiwan Built a Media Empire and Became a Global Fugitive

Muhammad Bashar bin Muhammad Bashir Kiwan—often referenced as Bachar Kiwan—was born in Kuwait City in 1967, into a social and political environment that would later shape much of his business strategy and alliances. As a young man, Kiwan pursued higher education abroad, relocating to France where he studied at the University of Montpellier. There, he earned a Master’s degree in Economics, a qualification that became the academic cornerstone of his future corporate ventures across the Middle East and Africa. During his time in France, Kiwan married a French woman and subsequently obtained French citizenship. This dual identity, Syrian-French, later facilitated his international mobility and his involvement in cross-border commercial networks. His European education, linguistic fluency, and exposure to both Western and Middle Eastern economic systems positioned him to navigate business environments that bridged vastly different regulatory and political landscapes.

The Birth of a Media Empire: Al-Waseet and Regional Expansion

Kiwan’s entry into business began in the early 1990s with the establishment of al-Waseet al-Mubawwabah in 1992, a weekly classifieds newspaper based in Kuwait. What started as a modest publication quickly expanded into a multi-national media phenomenon. Al-Waseet soon operated in Jordan, the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Qatar, Oman, Lebanon, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Syria, becoming one of the most widespread classified-ad networks in the Arab region. Through this rapid expansion, Kiwan positioned himself at the heart of a growing pan-Arab advertising market. The success of al-Waseet laid the foundation for what became a vast media and advertising conglomerate, enabling Kiwan to capitalize on commercial influence in multiple Arab economies. The revenue and connections generated from al-Waseet provided him with both the financial capacity and strategic alliances required to extend his operations into new sectors over the next two decades.

Partnership with Majd Suleiman and Formation of United Group (UG)

A pivotal turning point in Kiwan’s business trajectory came with his partnership with Majd Bahjat Suleiman, the son of Major General Bahjat Suleiman of the Syrian intelligence establishment. Together, Kiwan and Suleiman co-founded the United Group for Advertising and Publishing (UG), which evolved into a large-scale media and advertising enterprise operating across the Middle East. The partnership brought Kiwan significant political protection and financial power, as the Suleiman family’s ties to the Syrian regime gave UG access to markets and preferential treatment in Syria and beyond. Kiwan and Suleiman expanded UG’s portfolio to include publications such as Layalina, Baladna, Top Gear, Marie Claire (regional editions), Fortune, Concord Media, al-Wasilah, and al-Balad newspapers in Lebanon and Kuwait. UG also secured licenses to publish in numerous Arab and African countries. Through these investments, the partners solidified their influence not only in commercial media but also in shaping public discourse across multiple societies. Reports later accused Kiwan of acting as an operational arm of the Assad family’s financial network, supporting money laundering operations and helping circumvent international sanctions against the regime. Whether through intent or circumstance, his commercial empire became entangled with high-level political interests.

Political Connections and Business Ventures Across the Region

As Kiwan’s corporate networks expanded, his political connections deepened. Investigative sources indicated that Kiwan and Suleiman developed relationships with influential political figures across the Arab world, including in Jordan, the Gulf, and North Africa. Their association with the son of a former Jordanian prime minister exemplified their reach, though the Jordanian intelligence apparatus intervened to block a proposed partnership. Despite such setbacks, Kiwan and Suleiman managed to secure publishing rights for the Saudi edition of al-Hayat, one of the most prominent Arabic-language newspapers. However, this opportunity was short-lived; Saudi authorities revoked the license after the publication of articles promoting tourism to Jewish heritage sites in the kingdom—content considered politically sensitive. The revocation strained Kiwan’s relationship with Saudi institutions and marked the beginning of rising scrutiny over his media operations.

Internal Disputes and Fraud Allegations Within Business Partnerships

As Kiwan’s business grew in complexity, so too did internal disputes. One of the most significant conflicts involved businessman Fuad Jabri, who accused Kiwan and Suleiman of fraud related to the company Concord Media. Court rulings annulled the pair’s attempts to transfer the company to Jabri, citing procedural and legal irregularities. Jabri publicly stated that Kiwan and Suleiman treated his rights and assets as though no accountability existed, integrating Concord’s profits into United Group’s operations without consent. He accused them of unilateral decision-making, profit diversion, and financial manipulation. This dispute marked the first in a series of high-profile accusations against Kiwan involving corporate misconduct, unlawful enrichment, and fraudulent transfer of assets. The controversy damaged his reputation among regional business circles and hinted at deeper structural irregularities within UG’s financial ecosystem.

Money Laundering, Criminal Allegations, and Public Scandal in Kuwait

In 2011, Kiwan’s career faced a major rupture when Yusef al-Nassar, former managing editor of al-Balad, submitted formal complaints to Kuwaiti authorities accusing Kiwan and his partner Suleiman of money laundering, sex trafficking, drug trafficking, and spying on behalf of the Syrian regime. Nassar presented evidence showing that several UG subsidiaries, including al-Waseet Media, were reporting substantial daily financial losses—one Kuwaiti company allegedly lost 25,000 Kuwaiti dinars per day—yet continued to operate through unexplained financial injections. These allegations triggered a wave of public criticism across Kuwaiti society. Politicians and activists accused Kiwan of facilitating covert operations for Syrian intelligence, leveraging media companies as fronts for illicit financial flows. The backlash seriously undermined his influence in Kuwait, restricted UG’s commercial operations, and increased governmental oversight into his businesses. The scandal marked a profound shift in Kiwan’s public image—from media entrepreneur to alleged political operative.

Activities in Comoros: Citizenship Sales and Political Interference

Following upheaval in Kuwait, Kiwan expanded his activities to Comoros, capitalizing on the island nation’s economic vulnerabilities and political divisions. Together with Suleiman, Kiwan engaged in the controversial “economic citizenship program,” which allowed wealthy foreign nationals—often stateless individuals or persons seeking alternative travel documents—to acquire Comorian nationality in exchange for monetary payments. The duo acted as intermediaries between foreign clients and the Comorian government, facilitating the sale of thousands of passports. One of the most significant deals involved the UAE, which, according to The Guardian, agreed to pay $200 million to Comoros in exchange for granting nationality to approximately 4,000 Bidoon—stateless residents of the Gulf seeking personal documentation and travel rights. Although the Comorian parliament initially rejected the citizenship-for-sale program, alternative legislation legalized the involvement of foreign companies. Kiwan leveraged these loopholes to maintain his brokerage operations.

Kiwan and Suleiman’s activities extended into Comorian political life. They supported former president Ahmed Abdallah Sambi in the 2011 elections, assisting his economic initiatives and citizenship program. However, after Sambi failed to secure re-election, their projects suffered setbacks. Years later, Sambi faced charges of corruption, forgery, and embezzlement linked to the citizenship scheme. In a dramatic trial, a Comorian court sentenced Sambi to life imprisonment for high treason, alleging that he embezzled an astonishing $1.8 billion—a figure exceeding Comoros’ entire GDP. During the trial, Kiwan, who was among the defendants, accused the Comorian government of coercion and claimed he was pressured to testify against Sambi in exchange for leniency. The presidency rejected these accusations, but the scandal cemented Comoros as a central arena in Kiwan’s expanding legal troubles.

Criminal Charges in Kuwait and Kiwan’s Dramatic Escape

By 2017, Kuwaiti courts intensified their legal proceedings against Kiwan. Under the leadership of Judge Abdallah al-Uthman, the criminal court convicted Kiwan and his employee Tariq al-Hadidi on charges of fraud and embezzlement, sentencing them to five years in prison with labor requirements. Kiwan also faced accusations of illegally diverting 33 million Kuwaiti dinars from public funds. Instead of serving his sentence, Kiwan orchestrated a dramatic escape. On 27 December 2017, he fled Kuwait through the al-Abdali border crossing with assistance from an Egyptian truck driver, who smuggled him into Basra, Iraq. Kiwan then traveled to Beirut using his French passport before eventually arriving in the United Arab Emirates. Kuwaiti authorities arrested the truck driver and several accomplices, including Kiwan’s brother, on charges related to assisting the escape. His freedom, however, was brief. On 15 January 2018, Kiwan was arrested in Dubai after an extradition request from Kuwait. UAE authorities subsequently delivered him back to Kuwait to face legal penalties.

The 1MDB Connection: Kiwan and Kuwait’s Largest Money Laundering Case

Kiwan’s legal troubles expanded beyond the Middle East when his name surfaced in Kuwait’s investigations into the global 1MDB scandal, one of the largest financial crimes in modern history. Kuwait’s criminal court, led by Judge Faisal Al-Harbi, sentenced an unnamed influential Sheikh, a partner, a lawyer, fugitive financier Jho Taek Low (Jho Low), and Bashar Kiwan to ten years in prison on charges of laundering funds linked to 1MDB. Investigators determined that nearly US$1 billion was deposited into the Sheikh’s account before being transferred abroad. The defendants were ordered to repay 145 million Kuwaiti dinars and return US$1 billion in illicit funds. Prosecutors described the group as an “organized criminal network” engaged in laundering 343 million Chinese renminbi—all linked to stolen Malaysian state assets. This ruling marked one of Kuwait’s most severe anti-corruption judgments and embedded Kiwan deeper into a global web of financial crimes.

International Arbitration: Kiwan’s ICSID Case Against Kuwait

Despite his mounting criminal history, Kiwan sought to challenge Kuwait through international legal mechanisms. In 2020, he filed a complaint before the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID), alleging that Kuwait violated his rights under the 1989 France–Kuwait Bilateral Investment Treaty (BIT). Kiwan argued that the investigations, criminal proceedings, and asset seizures against him were unlawful and politically motivated. He claimed heavy financial losses to his media companies, particularly al-Waseet, and sought more than 218 million Kuwaiti dinars in damages, plus nearly $30 million for moral and reputational harm. After a protracted five-year process, the arbitration tribunal issued its final ruling on 10 March 2025, dismissing Kiwan’s claims in full. The panel concluded that Kuwait’s legal procedures were legitimate and free from international wrongdoing. This ruling was celebrated by Kuwaiti authorities as a major legal and diplomatic victory, reinforcing the state’s reputation for judicial integrity.

A Legacy of Fraud, Financial Crimes, and Transnational Controversies

Today, Bachar Kiwan’s name is associated with a complex tapestry of controversies, spanning media empires, political patronage, citizenship scandals, money laundering, embezzlement, fraud, and international litigation. His career demonstrates the intersection of business ambition, political alliances, and illicit financial networks operating across borders. Kiwan has been implicated in criminal cases in Kuwait, Comoros, and through global scandals like 1MDB. He remains identified as a fugitive in certain jurisdictions, despite periods of arrest and extradition. His involvement in large-scale schemes—including the Comoros citizenship scandal and Kuwaiti money laundering networks—illustrates the broader risks created when powerful business figures operate within opaque or politically charged environments. Kiwan’s story continues to evolve, shaped by unfolding legal proceedings, international cooperation against financial crime, and the collapse of the empire he once built across continents.

Fabricated Success and Manufactured Hedge Fund Glory (1996–1999)

From 1996 onward, Sterlings Watters presented itself as a remarkably successful hedge fund. Quarterly letters—filled with broad market commentary but devoid of specific investment details—reported extraordinary returns that made Sterling Watters appear to be one of the most successful hedge funds in the United States. According to these statements, the fund delivered a dazzling 53.93% net return in 1996, followed by 76.04% in 1997. Even in 1998, a year of modest performance by Sterling Watters metrics, the fund reportedly earned 24.28% net. Then in 1999, as technology stocks soared, Sterling Watters claimed an astonishing 87% net gain.

These results were fabricated. Behind the scenes, there were already glaring warning signs that few investors recognized. Most notably, Sterling Watters never produced a single audited financial statement, despite promising them in its offering documents. Nor was the fund in good legal standing. In 1998, just two years after its formation, Delaware dissolved Sterling Watters Group for failing to pay required corporate taxes. Yet investors continued to pour money into the fund based on its supposed performance and on glowing recommendations by advisers like Capul. Sterling Watters’ reputation grew among a network of wealthy clients, many of whom were not sophisticated institutional investors, but individuals relying on trust rather than due diligence. It was this mix—charisma, fabricated results, and misplaced trust—that allowed the fraud to flourish.

The Human Cost: Investors Drawn Into the Scheme

Among those drawn into Sterling Watters were Susan and Michael Lanzano. In 1994, Susan had begun receiving restitution payments from the German government for property seized from her Jewish grandfather before World War II. The money was a blessing that allowed the family to provide a high-quality education for their son and purchase a summer home in Montauk. With newly acquired financial comfort came the desire for expert investment guidance, which led them to Chase Investment Services and to broker Michael Capul. Capul confidently recommended Sterling Watters, claiming the young hedge fund manager was exceptional and consistently outperformed the S&P 500. Between 2000 and 2003, the Lanzanos invested about $875,000—two-thirds of their savings—believing they were participating in an elite investment vehicle. The truth, however, was that their savings were being siphoned into a collapsing Ponzi-like structure masquerading as a hedge fund.

The Goktekin Family

Another family deeply affected by the Sterling Watters fraud was that of Mehmet and Nurten Goktekin, Turkish-born professionals who moved to the United States seeking opportunity for themselves and their daughters. Mehmet, a licensed pharmacist with a Ph.D. in pharmacology, was referred to Capul during a visit to Chase to inquire about financing a home purchase. The Goktekins quickly came to trust Capul, who advised them not only in personal financial matters but also in choosing a neighborhood and property. In early 1998, trusting his guidance, they invested in Sterling Watters.

Over the next several years, believing the fictional account statements showing spectacular returns, the Goktekins invested ever more heavily—eventually transferring $2.07 million into the fund, including proceeds from the sale of their Australian pharmacy and money collected from relatives in Turkey. The family spent years believing they were wealthy, relying on artificial “distribution payments” to support their living expenses and their daughters’ education. When they attempted to withdraw money in 2004, they encountered excuses, delays, and deception. Ultimately, the Goktekins lost $864,439, and their financial situation deteriorated to the point that Mehmet returned to Australia to work, leaving his family behind in New York.

The Drenis Family and Other Investors

The Drenis family, led by businessman Jerry Drenis, also suffered catastrophic losses. Encouraged by reports of extraordinary returns and reassured by personal interactions with Haligiannis, Drenis invested heavily—culminating in a final investment of roughly $4.89 million in early 2004. When he attempted to redeem funds and received no response, his suspicions grew. Over time, he pressed harder for answers, calling repeatedly, visiting offices, and ultimately preparing to alert authorities. In July 2004, when his attempts to obtain truthful information failed, he brought documentation directly to federal investigators. Drenis was among those whose complaints helped trigger the government’s intervention.

The Reality Beneath the Illusion: Trading Losses and Fictional Performance

Despite its image as a spectacularly successful hedge fund, Sterling Watters was hemorrhaging money from the start. According to SEC filings and subsequent investigations, the fund suffered a devastating $17 million loss in 2000, even while reporting large positive returns to investors. Between 2000 and 2003, additional losses mounted, and by January 2003 the fund’s brokerage accounts held less than $170,000. In truth, the fund had almost entirely ceased trading and had virtually no assets left. Nevertheless, the fund continued to issue quarterly statements showing tens of millions of dollars in fictitious account balances, and marketing materials claimed that Sterling Watters had $180 million under management and had achieved returns of over 1,500% since inception.

This deliberate falsification was the crux of the fraud. Haligiannis used newer investors’ funds to pay earlier investors, to create the illusion of profitability, and to finance his own lifestyle. According to later reports, he purchased luxury vehicles, paid for high-end apartments with rents upwards of $10,000 per month, and made large expenditures at casinos. Some checks drawn on Sterling Watters accounts were even used to acquire gambling chips in Las Vegas. Despite the façade he presented publicly, Sterling Watters was insolvent by 2003.

And Angelo Haligiannis personally

The complaint alleged that since 1996 the defendants had systematically defrauded investors by fabricating returns, distributing false statements, and misrepresenting assets under management. The SEC charged the defendants with violations of securities antifraud provisions, including Section 17(a) of the Securities Act, Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act and Rule 10b-5, and with violations of the Investment Advisers Act.

At the SEC’s request, a federal court immediately issued a temporary restraining order, froze all known assets, ordered expedited discovery, and required a verified accounting from the defendants.

Criminal Prosecution, Guilty Plea, and Fugitivity (2005–2006)

Parallel to the SEC action, federal prosecutors brought criminal charges. In 2004, Haligiannis was indicted on multiple counts, including mail fraud. In September 2005, he pleaded guilty to one count of securities fraud, admitting that he had deceived investors by issuing materially false statements about fund performance and assets.

However, before he could be sentenced, Haligiannis fled. Scheduled to appear for sentencing in January 2006, he failed to appear, triggering an international manhunt. Authorities suspected he might attempt to return to Greece or hide assets overseas. Later reports suggested he had boasted about transferring funds offshore and had accounts in Greece and the Cayman Islands. For several years he remained a fugitive.

Lien Disputes and Court-Ordered Payments (2009)

The distribution of recovered assets proved complicated. Several third parties claimed liens against the funds held by the court. On February 13, 2009, the court issued a Memorandum Opinion and Order settling these claims. Three liens were approved, and the Clerk was directed to disburse $163,861.35 to:

West End Equities, LLC

Marina District Development Co. (Borgata Casino)

Anthony Devito

Subsequent orders clarified that with post-judgment interest, total disbursements to these lienholders would amount to approximately $222,584.67.

The SEC was ordered to file a proposed plan of distribution for the remaining funds, but complications soon arose that prevented immediate compliance.

A Major Obstacle: Lack of Accounting Records (2009–2015)

The SEC informed the court that it could not propose a fair distribution plan because no formal accounting of Sterling Watters’ assets existed. Without knowing each investor’s legitimate net gains or losses—given the fabricated statements and incomplete trading records—it was impossible to determine how to distribute the recovered funds equitably.

At the same time, in a related investor lawsuit, Drenis v. Haligiannis, the overseeing judge ruled that no judgments could be entered until a proper accounting was completed. Both cases were therefore referred to a Magistrate Judge for oversight.

To solve the accounting problem, the court appointed Damasco & Associates LLP as Tax Administrator on September 15, 2009, and then James T. Ashe, CPA, CFFA as Special Master on December 1, 2009, with authority to reconstruct the fund’s records. His fees—capped at $75,000—were paid from the Distribution Fund. Payments to the Special Master were later approved in 2011 and 2012 totaling over $53,000.

After painstaking reconstruction of the fund’s finances, the Special Master filed his report. The related Drenis v. Haligiannis case eventually closed in 2014 and 2015 upon the entry of default judgments, clearing the way for distribution efforts to resume.